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Abstract
On 28 June, 2018, the Florence Competition Programme (FCP) 
and the Communications and Media Area of the Florence 
School of Regulation (FSR C&M) of the Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), jointly organised with 
Bird & Bird LLP, a workshop in Brussels. The title of the event 
was ‘EU Competition Law vs Sector Regulation in Shaping 
the Digital Single Market. Back to the Future?’. The workshop 
aimed to discuss the interaction of competition policy and 
sector-specific regulation in the context of the Digital Single 
Market (DSM) Strategy that was adopted by the European 
Commission in May 2015. It included two panels, which dealt, 
respectively, with the concerns expressed by regulators on 
geo-blocking and the revision of the European Commission’s 
Guidelines on Significant Market Power (SMP) in the electronic 
communications sector. The event gathered representatives 
from National Competition Authorities (NCAs), the European 
Commission, academia, industry, as well as law and economic 
consulting firms. The diversity of views ensured a lively debate. 
This Policy Brief summarises the main points that were raised 
during the discussion and seeks to stimulate further debate.
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Panel I - The Geo-blocking Regulation and 
Antitrust Enforcement
The Geo-blocking Regulation,1 which entered into 
force on the 22nd March, 2018, will apply from 3rd 
December, 2018, to all of the traders who actively 
offer their goods or services to EU end-users in the 
European Union, regardless of whether the trader is 
established in the EU or in a third country. The new 
rules prohibit direct and indirect discrimination 
based on the customers’ nationality, place of 
residence or establishment, including the automatic 
rerouting of customers. 
First, during the workshop, participants remarked 
that the Regulation forms part of the EU’s wider 
DSM strategy. It offers a concrete example of what 
the consumers’ benefits associated with the creation 
of an internal market would be. The removal of 
unjustified geo-blocking, and of other forms of 
discrimination, applied by traders to artificially 
segment the market represents the leitmotif of 
the newly enacted framework. The Commission’s 
regulatory efforts to enhance online shopping and 
cross-border trade through the use of competition 
law is reflected in the core provisions which ban 
unilateral conduct by any dealer, even in the absence 
of market power. Article 3 of the Regulation states 
that traders cannot block or limit a customer’s access 
to the trader’s online interface. By virtue of Article 
4, the application of different general conditions 
of access to goods or services for reasons related 
to the customer’s nationality, place of residence 
or establishment, is prohibited in all cases when 
customers try to acquire (a) goods; (b) electronically 
supplied services, with the important exception of 
copyright-protected works or matters, and (c) non-
electronically supplied services. Article 5 sets out the 
non-discrimination principle for reasons that are 
related to payment transactions. 
1.  Regulation (EU) 2018/302 of the European Parliament and 
the Council of 28th February, 2018, on addressing unjustified 
geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on cus-
tomers’ nationality, place of residence or place of establishment 
within the internal market and amending Regulations (EC) No 
2006/2004 and (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC. OJ L 
60I, 2.3.2018, pp. 1–15.
Furthermore, Article 6 establishes an important 
distinction between active sales (i.e., when retailers 
are actively targeting customers) and passive sales 
(i.e., when sales are made in response to unsolicited 
orders). Restrictions falling outside the scope of 
the Geo-Blocking Regulation which are covered 
by the Vertical Block Exemption 330/2010, are not 
affected. However, passive sales restrictions that 
lead to a violation of the Geo-Blocking Regulation 
are automatically void under Article 6(2). Speakers 
at the seminar stressed that the exclusion of the 
copyright-protected works from the scope of the 
Regulation was the subject of intense debate before 
the European Parliament. In this respect, in the 
statement annexed to the Regulation, the European 
Commission has explicitly mentioned that in the 
future whether a new legislative proposal will have 
to be enacted will be assessed, following the results 
of the evaluation of the first two years. 
One strand of the debate thus dealt with the 
presentation of the main findings of a recent study, 
conducted by Oxera Consulting LLP in May 2016,2 
to outline the reasons justifying the exclusion of 
copyrighted works from the scope of the application 
of the Geo-blocking Regulation. The study holds 
that the audiovisual (AV) industry has developed 
on the basis of a differentiation by geography that 
currently makes it possible to reflect the different 
consumers’ content valuations, which are driven 
by cultural differences, tastes and preferences, as 
well as the different costs that are associated with 
serving each market. The study presents empirical 
evidence in support of the argument that imposing 
a greater cross-border access to audiovisual content 
and services would expose consumers to significant 
losses in quality, diversity and access to content in 
the short run, and would produce several adverse 
effects, detrimental to the AV sector as a whole, in 
the medium to long term. 
In addition, participants focused on the various efforts 
undertaken by the European Commission in the fight 
2.  Oxera, The impact of cross-border access to audiovisual con-
tent on EU consumers, May 2016, available at: https://www.
oxera.com/wp-content/uploads/media/oxera_library/down-
loads/2016-05-13-Cross-border-report-(final).pdf.
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against geo-blocking practices, which have been on 
the European legislator’s radar for a while. In fact, in 
parallel to its legislative initiatives, the Commission 
has also challenged geo-blocking measures under the 
EU competition rules (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU). 
It has also launched a number of individual antitrust 
investigations, which are still pending before DG 
Competition.3 However, it was noted that, although 
competition rules are flexible, they are case-centered 
and not exactly suitable for enforcing general legal 
principles. By contrast, sector-specific regulation 
offers more legal certainty but because of its rigidity, 
it presents the disadvantage of becoming outdated 
more rapidly. Through the enactment of the Geo-
blocking Regulation, the European legislator seems 
to have found a compromise, since the adopted set 
of rules appears to be minimal, which leaves room 
for future legislative initiatives, even at the national 
level, if needed. In the near future, it should be 
assessed whether this may be understood as part of 
a new trend, established by the Commission, in the 
effort to bridge the gap between competition law and 
regulation in digital markets. 
More broadly, in order to better explain the strong 
interplay between competition and regulation, some 
recent cases were discussed during the seminar. 
These were cases in which competition law has been 
used to signal significant market failures while, 
at the same time, opening up the path to more 
articulated regulatory intervention. In a decision 
concerning the pharmaceutical manufacturer Pfizer 
and its distributor Flynn Pharma Limited, the UK 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) found 
both companies guilty of abusing their dominant 
positions in the narrowly defined market for 
phenytoin sodium capsules by excessively increasing 
their prices.4 Participants thus agreed on the fact 
3.  Antitrust investigations have been launched in the consumer 
electronics, video game, hotel industry, clothing, and licensed 
merchandise sectors, as well as into the licensing and distribu-
tion practices of movie studios. Some of these enforcement ac-
tions target copyrighted content, and thus may reach beyond the 
Regulation’s scope.
4.  However, it must be noted that on 7th June, 2018, the Competi-
tion Appeal Tribunal (CAT) quashed the CMA’s decision hold-
ing that a purely excessive pricing decision had been undertaken 
with no serious allegation regarding misconduct. In fact, accord-
that, while the European community’s disapproval 
of geo-blocking practices is clearly reflected in the 
ban on unilateral conduct that is contained in the 
core provisions of the Regulation, it is not possible 
to predict, whether, and to what extent, this might 
pave the way for further regulatory actions.
The speakers argued that, in competition law, the 
notion of ‘price discrimination’ refers to the practice 
of selling the same product to different customers 
at different prices, even though the production/
distribution costs of the product are the same.5 It 
was underlined that, according to a consolidated 
economic literature, prohibiting price discrimination 
does not necessarily produce the result of increasing 
consumers’ welfare. In fact, requiring producers/
distributors to sell a product at the same price in 
all Member States may harm customers in lower 
income countries, who often end up paying more 
than consumers in wealthier Member States in 
comparison. 
Furthermore, it was argued that one of the most 
controversial aspects of the Regulation lies in its 
adoption of a non-dynamic perspective, given its 
focus on increasing the choices for consumers, 
without taking the impact on market structure 
into due consideration. In this respect, participants 
submitted the idea that the Regulation might be the 
source of new market failures in the near future: if 
smaller providers were pushed out of the market due 
to compliance with the Regulation’s requirements, 
fewer larger providers would be in the position to 
compete amongst each other; and thus the more 
concentrated structure of the market might favor 
anti-competitive practices. 
This session was concluded by stating that, beyond 
considering the adoption of the Geo-blocking 
Regulation to be appropriate, timely or satisfactory, 
ing to the Tribunal, excessive pricing cases, should remain rare. 
Overall, the authorities should be wary of taking up the price 
regulators’ tasks, unless this is ‘soundly based on proper evi-
dence and analysis’. Flynn Pharma Ltd and Flynn Pharma (Hold-
ings) Ltd v Competition and Markets Authority & Pfizer Inc. and 
Pfizer Limited v Competition and Markets Authority, [2018] CAT 
11, text of the judgment available at: http://www.catribunal.org.
uk/files/1275-1276_Flynn_Judgment_CAT_11_070618.pdf.
5.  Richard A Posner, Antitrust Law, 2d ed., Chicago, 2001.
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it is now time for all the EU Member States to 
enforce it through a process that is likely to require 
significant effort.   
Panel II - Collective Dominance and SMP 
Guidelines in Electronic Communications
During the second session of the workshop, 
participants pointed out that SMP Guidelines 
represent a vital tool for the performance of 
the telecoms National Regulatory Authorities’ 
(NRAs) forward-looking analysis in the electronic 
communications sector in the EU. Being directly 
referenced in the EU Regulatory Framework, the 
Guidelines can be regarded as the main basis of the 
NRAs’ approach to defining the relevant products and 
geographical markets, as well as for the assessment 
of the existence of Significant Market Power (SMP).
Given this framework, the main issue, that has 
been explored from both an economic and legal 
perspective since the first enactment of the text of the 
Guidelines in 2002,6 has dealt with the applicability 
of the concept of joint or collective SMP when tacit 
coordination arising from an oligopoly situation 
is at stake. Whereas NCAs can rely on Article 102 
TFEU to sanction collective dominance, ex-ante 
regulation seems to have suffered from remarkable 
enforcement gaps, which have encouraged the 
European Commission to undertake a substantial 
revision of the Guidelines. 
The new text reflects the peculiarities of the 
telecommunications sector, which has witnessed 
the deployment of Next Generation Access 
(NGA) networks, the advent of Over-the-top 
(OTT) players, competition from cable networks, 
technological convergence, and a wave of mergers 
and acquisitions, in the last few years, making it 
particularly conducive to collusion. However, at 
the beginning of the negotiation process relating 
to the revised Guidelines, different solutions, not 
6.  Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment 
of significant market power under the Community regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and ser-
vices, OJ C 165, 11.7.2002, p. 6–31.
necessarily mutually exclusive amongst each other, 
were put on the table.
The most interesting and fully comprehensive 
proposal encompassed the exact determination of 
the concept of joint SMP, which has been taken into 
full consideration by the legislator when adopting 
the new version of the Guidelines. In this respect, 
the study carried out by the German consulting 
firm, WIK, for the European Commission,7 made it 
clear that the NRAs’ prospective analysis represents 
a sophisticated task, which may encounter several 
different challenges in oligopolistic markets. On the 
one hand, behavioral factors may influence market 
outcomes, and thus require careful consideration 
when the assessment is conducted. On the other 
hand, structural elements, such as SMP-based 
regulation, may obscure the economic indicators 
at the wholesale and retail levels, requiring the 
application of the so-called ‘Modified Greenfield 
Approach’ to test whether tacit coordination is the 
likely outcome in the absence of such regulation.8 
This illustrates well the extent to which the 
assessment of joint SMP may be complex. Overall, 
there was agreement on the fact that NRAs’ analysis 
should be based on a combination of both structural 
and behavioral elements. 
In one strand of the debate, the main question 
remaining open was whether the clarification of 
the concept of joint SMP can be deemed consistent 
with EU competition legal principles as well as its 
case law. It was noted that the final version of the 
Guidelines, published on, April 26 2018,9 has been 
conceived so as to ensure that this objective was met, 
since the most important updates that have occurred 
7.  WIK Consult, Review of the Significant Market Power (SMP) 
Guidelines, A study prepared for the European Commis-
sion, 2017, available at: https://www.wik.org/fileadmin/Studi-
en/2018/2018_SMP_Guidelines.pdf.
8.  In this case, the forward-looking ex-ante SMP assessment must 
control for the effects of pre-existing regulation, while taking 
into account regulation in related markets, in order to correctly 
identify the counterfactuals and the theories of harm that need 
to be remedied using regulatory tools.
9.  Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on market 
analysis and the assessment of significant market power under 
the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services, OJ C 159, 7.5.2018, p. 1–15.
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in the field are taken into utmost consideration. 
Another strand of the debate argued that, in the 
future, it remains to be seen whether this approach 
will ensure a fully, and satisfactory, methodological 
guidance for regulators.10
The economic basics of joint dominance were thus 
debated during the seminar. It was remarked that 
the economic literature predominantly uses the 
expression ‘tacit collusion’, even though it does 
not involve any ‘collusion’ in the legal sense; the 
expression ‘tacit coordination’ would thus be more 
appropriate. The framework for analysing these 
types of conduct is provided by the ‘repeated game 
theory’. According to game theory, frequent dynamic 
interactions allow firms to sustain supra-competitive 
prices. When interacting with each other, in fact, 
firms may be able to keep higher prices by tacitly 
agreeing that any deviation from the collusive path 
would trigger some retaliation. 
According to economists, three criteria that need to be 
satisfied would exist in order for a finding of collective 
dominance to be established in competition law. 
First, firms should have the ability and the incentives 
to arrive at a coordinated outcome - the focal point 
- even when collusive equilibria may be difficult to 
achieve, especially when there is no communication 
channel among the firms. Market transparency is thus 
key to allowing firms to be aware of the way in which 
the others’ market conduct is evolving. Second, firms 
should have the ability and incentives to sustain the 
coordinated outcome in order to make the conduct 
stable internally. To that end, retaliation needs to be 
sustainable: it must entail, for the deviating firms, a 
very significant loss of profit if compared to the profit 
that it would be possible to obtain by adhering to the 
collusive behavior. In particular, retaliation should 
be effective in preventing firms from deviating 
(Ivaldi et al., 2003).  Third, ‘collusion’ needs to be 
stable ‘externally’: this happens when there are no 
potential or actual market constraints (e.g., non-
10.  As regards the other proposals, it was observed that while the 
legislator has decided to embrace the proposal concerning the 
extension of the scope of symmetric regulation, the idea of in-
cluding some provisions that are devoted to tight oligopolies, as 
per BEREC’s opinion delivered on 16th March, 2018, was finally 
discarded.
collusive firms, potential entrants or consumers) 
destabilising the outcome of the collusive behavior.
These three criteria also represent the cumulative 
conditions of the preferred legal test that is used 
to establish that joint SMP may flow from an 
oligopolistic environment that is based on the EU 
Court of Justice’s case law, and, in particular, the 
Airtours11 leading case (2002). The new Guidelines, 
rather than imposing a mechanical verification of 
each of the criteria taken in isolation, recommend 
that NRAs consider the whole mechanism of 
hypothetical tacit coordination, following the 
more recent Impala case, which has been explicitly 
referenced in the new text of the Guidelines.12 
Participants thus submitted the idea that no major 
change in substance has been produced, despite the 
Guidelines being much more articulated on this 
point. Another strand of the debate argued that, in 
addition to telecommunications, other sectors are 
witnessing a process of deep consolidation that may 
revamp the application of collective dominance.
A further point raised during this part of the 
discussion dealt with the interplay between 
regulation and competition law: participants agreed 
that an NRA’s decision establishing collective 
dominance should not necessarily lead to an antitrust 
assessment on joint dominance, which would have 
even more complex features if compared with an 
ex-ante prospective analysis.
It was concluded that the approach followed by the 
European legislator is likely to lead to the creation of 
a more diversified approach to regulation across the 
EU Member States, and that the need for a further 
amendment of the legal text of the Guidelines may 
arise again in the near future. 
11.  Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission EU:T:2002:146.
12.  Case C-413/06 P Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America 
v Impala [2008] ECR I-4951.
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